Limited Commitment, Inaction and Optimal Monetary Policy by Tokhir Mirzoev




JEL Codes: E50, E52, E58
Keywords: central bank, monetary policy, commitment, stabilization bias.
Abstract
This paper examines the optimal frequency of monetary policy meetings when their schedule is pre-
announced. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that in the standard New Keynesian framework
infrequent but periodic revision of monetary policy may be desirable even when there are no explicit costs
of policy adjustment. Adjustment of policy on a pre-announced schedule de facto acts as a commitment not
to adjust in intermediate periods. We ¯nd that at short horizons gains from such commitment outweigh
welfare costs of central bank's inaction. Second, we solve for the optimal frequency of policy adjustment and
characterize its determinants. When applied to the U.S. economy, our analysis suggests that the Federal
Open Markets Committee should revise the federal funds target rate no more than twice a year.
1 Introduction
As Clarida et. al. (1999) point out, no major central bank has announced a life-time
commitment to a speci¯c monetary policy rule. Thus, theoretical research has devoted a
¤Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, 1945 North High Street, Columbus, OH 43210,
Tel: (614) 292-6701, Email: mirzoev.1@osu.edu. I'm indebted to Bill Dupor and Paul Evans for invaluable
advice and suggestions, Joseph Kaboski, Huston McCulloch, and seminar participants at the Ohio State
University for constructive comments on earlier drafts. All remaining errors are mine. MATLAB codes used
in the paper are available upon request.
1great deal of attention to designing policies that could in one way or another mimic long-
term commitment. In this paper we consider a simple policy that to some extent is already
in place: the practice of holding infrequent and periodic monetary policy meetings.
Our motivation comes from two observations. First, central banks around the world
make monetary policy decisions at discrete times and with di®ering frequency. The Bank
of England's recent survey of over ninety central banks found that seven central banks held
policy making meetings less than monthly, about thirty six had monthly meetings, while the
rest made policy decisions more frequently, some even on a daily basis1.
Second, in the absence of major shocks to the economy most major central banks hold
policy meetings regularly. For example, the Bank of Japan's monetary policy meetings take
place twice a month, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank meets monthly,
while the Federal Open Markets Committee in the U.S. revises the federal funds target rate
eight times a year. Moreover, most monetary authorities in developed countries announce
the schedule of policy meetings in advance.
A natural question is whether there are bene¯ts of infrequent policy adjustment in the
absence of explicit commitment to a particular policy rule. By analogy with the sticky price
literature, it is tempting to justify infrequent policy meetings by appealing to administrative
di±culties, or other policy adjustment costs. It would then follow that the optimal frequency
of policy meetings should depend on the tradeo® between central banks' internal cost of
adjustment and social losses arising from policy makers' inaction. However, the adjustment
cost analogy is unlikely to provide a complete story. For example, it is not useful in explaining
the fact that some major central banks (e.g. the Bank of Japan, the ECB and the Bank of
England) have policy meetings more often than some smaller ones (e.g. the Bank of Canada
or the Riksbank). More importantly, the analogy does not exploit the external e®ects of
central banks' actions. Note that when policy is adjusted on a pre-announced schedule, then
1See Mahadeva and Sterne (2000), chart 7.5. How often do policy-makers meet to decide on the setting
of policy instruments? In the rest of the paper by policy adjustment we shall assume changes of the main
policy instrument/target at the policy makers' level such as the revision of federal funds target rate at FOMC
meetings.
2following each policy meeting central bankers not only announce a new target, but also de
facto promise to keep it ¯xed until the next meeting. Such implicit promises can be viewed
as sequential short-term commitments. Therefore, the appropriate tradeo® in choosing the
frequency of policy meetings is between the volatility of in°ation and output arising from
inaction and the bene¯ts of short-term sequential commitments.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we show that in the standard New
Keynesian model and for most plausible parameter values infrequent but periodic policy
adjustment is preferable to pure discretion even without any adjustment costs. Second, we
solve for the optimal frequency of monetary policy meetings. Applied to the U.S. economy,
our analysis suggests that the FOMC should meet no more than twice a year.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we consider a central bank in the
Clarida et. al. (1999) world that is not able (or not willing) to make a life-time commitment
to a policy rule (i.e. operates under pure discretion). As they show, even in the absence of
the Barro and Gordon (1983) problem of in°ationary bias, commitment is welfare improving
because the impact of policy decisions on private sector forecasts improves the in°ation-
output variability tradeo®. To this we add that a welfare improving commitment need not
be life-time: central banks that are unwilling to make long-term promises could instead o®er
short-term sequential commitments and also improve welfare relative to pure discretion.
Furthermore, we solve for the optimal monetary policy under limited time commitment and
¯nd signi¯cant diminishing marginal returns from lengthier commitment. In the benchmark
model announcing a new policy rule every year allows the central bank to realize about 90
percent of the total possible gains from life-time commitment. This is discussed in section
2.
Next, in section 3 we characterize a simple policy of infrequent adjustment where the
central bank vows to revise the interest rate only every other period. One can think of
this scenario as a policy of sequential short-term commitments to a degenerate non-state
contingent rule - a commitment not adjust the policy. We ¯nd that infrequent adjustment
3is preferred to pure discretion for most plausible parameter values. The intuition behind
this ¯nding is straightforward. A discretionary policy allows a timely response to exogenous
disturbances, but features higher output costs of reducing in°ation. On the other hand,
under infrequent adjustment, the central bank acts as if under commitment every second
period, but leaves some shocks in non-meeting months unanswered. While the latter con-
tributes to the volatility of target variables, the e®ects of commitment are the opposite. In
particular, commitment reduces the cost disin°ation at the time of adjustment and prompts
a more aggressive response to in°ationary pressures. Quick disin°ations make the e®ects of
exogenous shocks on in°ation die out faster under periodic adjustment than they do under
period-by-period adjustment. This e®ect contains in°ationary expectations and in°ation it-
self in non-meeting months, producing lower volatility of in°ation in all periods. We ¯nd that
for many plausible parameter values these bene¯ts from commitment dominate the destabi-
lizing e®ects of inaction. Section 4 discusses the optimal frequency of policy meetings, its
determinants and the application of our analysis to the U.S. case. Section 5 concludes.
2 Short-term Sequential Commitments
2.1 The Model
We consider a central bank in the world of Clarida et. al. (1999), hereafter CGG99. It seeks
















The economy is described by the usual New Keynesian IS and Phillips curves:
xt = ¡'(it ¡ Et¼t+1) + Etxt+1 + gt (2)
¼t = ¸xt + ¯Et¼t+1 + ut (3)
4where it is the nominal interest rate, ¼t is the rate of in°ation, xt captures log deviations
of real output from its natural level (output gap) and the two exogenous state variables ut
(cost-push shifts) and gt (demand shifts) evolve according to:
gt = ¹gt¡1 + ^ gt (4)
ut = ½ut¡1 + ^ ut (5)
The exact interpretation of the cost-push and demand shifts depends on the level of gen-
erality in the underlying nonlinear model. With government spending, variable markups
and technology shocks each shift can be a combination of various types of disturbances: gt
usually incorporates government spending (as in Clarida et. al. (1999)) and shocks to the
growth rate of natural output (as in Woodford (1999)). Similarly, in the general setup ut
captures exogenous variations in deviations between the marginal disutility of labor and the
marginal product of labor.2
Note that the formulation of equation (1) assumes the absence of the in°ationary bias,
which occurs when the central bank targets a level of output above its natural level.3 This
is done for two reasons. First, the in°ationary bias results in higher average in°ation. The
recent experience of the U.S. and most European countries does not suggest the presence
of such bias. Secondly, in°ationary bias is likely to lower welfare regardless of how often
the policy makers meet and would not a®ect the rankings of the policies we consider. The
primary focus of this paper is the role of commitment in removing the stabilization bias:
over-stabilization of output under discretionary policies. Unlike the in°ationary bias, the
stabilization bias results in excessive volatility of in°ation. Volatility of in°ation is likely to
be a more serious problem than its average level.
In the exercises below we base our choice of parameter values on the micro-foundations
2We do not argue that the model in (1)-(5) is a good representation of reality. This framework was chosen
due to its popularity and in order to better relate to existing studies. In section 4.3. we brie°y discuss some
alternative model assumptions that could be of interest for future research.
3See Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
5behind the model. The IS equation is derived from the consumption Euler equation, where
' is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. The plausible range of ' suggested in many
studies lies between 0.5 and 1 (log utility). In the benchmark model we use an intermediate
value: ' = 0:67. We choose ¯ = 0:997 since the focus is on the monthly frequency. The
Phillips curve is commonly derived from Calvo pricing equation, in which ¸ takes the form:
¸ =










where µ is the probability that a ¯rm will not change its price in any given period, ´ is
the weight of labor in the Cobb-Douglas production function, # is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of the labor supply. Common assumptions in the literature suggest µ = 11
12 and
´ = 2
3. There is little agreement about the appropriate value for the labor supply elasticity.
We use a high value of elasticity ( 1
# = 5, or # = 0:2) as prescribed by Prescott (2003) and
used in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992, 1997) and Gali et. al. (2003). The optimal weight





where q is the demand elasticity. We set the latter at 6, which implies a steady state markup
over marginal costs of 20%:
Innovations to cost and demand shifts are assumed uncorrelated with each other with
standard deviations of: ¾^ u = ¾^ g = 0:001. Finally, the persistence parameters are: ½ = ¹ =
0:8: In section 4 we consider an alternative calibration of the stochastic processes based on
the U.S. data.
4See Woodford (2003), chapter 6, proposition 6.2.
62.2 Discretion vs. Life-Time Commitment
We begin by discussing the optimal policy under discretion and under life-time commitment.
While the optimality of the latter is well known, here we re-state the main argument in order
to motivate further discussion of alternative policies.
In the absence of commitment, which we will refer to as pure discretion, the central bank
does not make any promises as to how it will adjust the interest rates in the future. Thus
every period it minimizes contemporaneous losses while taking all forecasts as given. To
obtain the solution it is convenient to ¯rst choose in°ation and output that maximize the
objective function subject to (3) and then obtain the interest rate from (2). The ¯rst order









Using this in (3), we obtain:
xt =
®¯
® + ¸2Etxt+1 ¡
¸
® + ¸2ut
Recursive substitution together with (5) yields a solution:5
xnc






Note that the resulting interest rate policy always neutralizes demand shocks in the sense
that it makes in°ation and output react to supply shocks only.
Next, consider the case of commitment. For simplicity, as in CGG99 we begin by examin-
ing policies that that have the same functional form as under pure discretion, i.e. ¼ = !1¢ut
and xt = !2ut. Then future target variables can be expressed as multiples of their current
period values: ¼t+j = ¼t
ut+j
ut and xt+j = xt
ut+j
ut : The objective function (1) can therefore be
5The interest rate that implements the solution can be recovered from (2). Using the notation of Clarida
et. al (1999), it can be represented as: it = °¼Et¼t+1 + 1
























where T is the policy horizon (1 in the standard case). Note that since the summation term
in the last equation is exogenous, minimizing (9) is equivalent to minimizing current period
losses (®x2
t + ¼2
t). The ¯rst order condition, obtained by minimizing the objective function




¼t = 0 (10)
The term @¼t
@xt is crucial in determining the tradeo® between in°ation and output. Under
discretion the central bank is unable to a®ect forecasts of the future. Hence from (3) we
have @¼t
@xt = ¸; i.e. the output cost of reducing in°ation by one unit is 1
¸. On the other hand,
under life-time commitment the central bank can count on the private sector to expect
Et¼t+1 = ½¼t. This ability to credibly in°uence private sector forecasts modi¯es the Phillips








Hence, under commitment we have: @¼t
@xt = ¸
1¡¯½; so that only
1¡¯½
¸ units of output need to be
sacri¯ced in order to bring in°ation down by one unit. The multiplicative constant (1 ¡ ¯½)
captures 'savings' in the form of lower output costs of reducing in°ation that arise from the
central bank's ability to a®ect private sector forecasts. A complete solution is obtained by












where k = 1 ¡ ¯½: Note that output (in°ation) under discretion is less (more) volatile than
6The interest rate rule implied by the solution is given by it = °c
¼Et¼t+1+ 1
'gt, where °¼ = 1+
(1¡½)¸
½'®(1¡¯½).
8under commitment. This is the stabilization bias, which is primarily due to high costs
of reducing in°ation under discretion. Under commitment, lower costs of reducing in°ation
prompt the central to 'buy' more in°ation reduction at the cost of some extra output volatility
(k < 1) thus alleviating the problem of stabilization bias. To see the welfare gains from
commitment note that from (12) the unconditional expectation of the loss function can be




1¡¯E(u2): It is easy to show that the loss is minimized
when k = (1 ¡ ¯½) and that any policy taking the form of (12) with (1 ¡ ¯½) < k < 1 is
preferred to the case of pure discretion (k = 1).
2.3 Discretion vs. Short-Term Commitment
The commitment described above was life-time. Such arrangement may be both unrealistic
(e.g. because chairmen of central banks have limited terms in o±ce) and undesirable (e.g.
because of model uncertainty or because of extraordinary circumstances requiring deviations
from the announced rule). As an alternative, central banks could use short-term commit-
ments, i.e. announce policy rules that are valid for a pre-determined period of time. Such
short-term promises allow the monetary authority to credibly in°uence private sector fore-
casts in the periods when the commitment is valid, but not in the long-run. Intuitively, we
should expect such policy to be suboptimal relative to life-time commitment, but perform
better than pure discretion.
As a simple veri¯cation, consider a monetary authority that announces a new com-
mitment every other period7. Thus, its powers are restricted to a®ecting only one period
ahead forecasts. It can be shown that under a class of linear interest rate rules considered







. Note that in this case (1 ¡ ¯½) < k < 1; implying that even though
life-time commitment is still the ¯rst best, central banks that are unwilling to commit forever
can achieve a better outcome than pure discretion by o®ering short-term commitments.
7This is similar to the analysis of partial commitment in ¯scal policy in Klein and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003).
8A complete solution is provided in Appendix A:
92.4 Short-Term vs. Life-Time Commitment Under Unconstrained
Optimum
Next, we evaluate relative welfare gains under life-time and short-term commitments when
the policy under each scenario is globally optimal. Under life{time commitment the central











°t+i (¼t+i ¡ ¸xt+i ¡ ¯Et¼t+1+i ¡ ut+i)
¸) (13)
The optimal policy sets in°ation in proportion to the change output (see CGG99):
xt+i ¡ xt+i¡1 = ¡¸
®¼t+i, i = 1;2;3:::::
and xt+i = ¡¸
®¼t+i, i = 0
(14)
As an alternative, suppose that every T + 1 periods the central bank announces a new
commitment that is valid for T periods in the future. It can be shown that the optimal
policy announced at date t and valid until t + T (the 'commitment cycle') closely resembles
(14) 9:
xt+i ¡ xt+i¡1 = ¡¸
®¼t+i, i = 1;2;3:::::T
and xt+i = ¡¸
®¼t+i, i = 0
(15)
The only di®erence between (14) and (15) is that the short-term commitment expires at
t+T and at t+T +1 a new announcement is made. Model stationarity implies that at the
beginning of each commitment cycle the central bank will always announce the same policy.
9Appendix B provides a complete solution. Note that this model resembles those of Schaumburg and
Tambalotti (2002) and Kara (2003). Both of these studies consider a similar setting. Their models examine
'Calvo type' central bankers who o®er life-time commitments, but each period face a constant probability of
being replaced. The central bankers in our model are more of the 'Taylor type' - they are being replaced after
serving ¯xed terms in o±ce. We consider the latter to be a more plausible scenario for developed countries.
In any case, they also ¯nd that most of the gains from commitment occur at short horizons.
10Figure 1: Gains From Limited Commitment
a
























































t Rho = 0.99
Rho = 0.8
Rho = 0.5
aGains from limited commitment relative to pure discretion as a
fraction of total gains obtained under life-time commitment
To evaluate the relative performance of the two arrangements, we solve the model above un-
der various durations of commitment (T) and measure welfare gains implied by each policy10.
Figure (1) plots welfare gains under sequential commitments of various lengths as a fraction
of the total gains obtained under life-time commitment. A striking feature in Figure (1) is
the presence of strong diminishing returns from lengthier commitment. For example, in the
benchmark speci¯cation sequential 12-month commitments allow the central bank to realize
about 90% of the total gains obtained under life-time commitment. When the persistence of
the cost-push shocks is reduced to 0.5, then the same fraction of the gains can be obtained
by committing to a new policy every six months. Intuitively, under commitment the optimal
policy seeks not only to eliminate the contemporaneous e®ects of current exogenous shocks,
but also to neutralize the predetermined component of future expected e®ects coming from
persistence (Et(ut+1) = ½ut). When persistence is large, then current innovations a®ect the
forecasts of in°ation and output far into the future making long-term commitment more
10Welfare gains were measured by the di®erence of the unconditional expectation of the loss function (1)
under each case of commitment and under pure discretion.
11important.11
Another reason for substantial gains from short-term commitments lies in their sequential
nature. In any announcement period we expect the optimal policy to in°uence short-term
private sector forecasts in a way that allows greater stabilization of in°ation within the 'com-
mitment' cycle. Moreover, in equilibrium agents expect the same policy to be re-announced
after the expiration of the current commitment. Hence, the stabilization properties of the
current policy are also embedded into the agents' long-term forecasts of future policy deci-
sions. More stable long-term forecasts of in°ation, in turn, further contain current in°ation,
thus multiplying the stabilizing e®ects of the announced commitment. This extra e®ect
produces large overall welfare gains even when the commitment is set to expire soon.
To this end we have shown that the ability of short-term sequential commitments to a®ect
private sector forecasts both in the short-run and in the long-run, makes them preferable to
pure discretion and provides a useful alternative to life-time commitment when the latter
is unfeasible. The prescription of this section is useful for central banks that possess at
least a short-term commitment technology. Next, we consider a case when commitment to
state-contingent rules in not feasible and examine a simple alternative - infrequent policy
adjustment.
3 Infrequent Monetary Policy Adjustment
Central banks' unwillingness (or inability) to commit to explicit policy rules prompts re-
searchers to look for implementable arrangements that somehow resemble commitment.
Here we consider a simple policy of infrequent but periodic monetary policy adjustment.
An attractive feature of such policy is its implementability: to some extent it is already
in place since central banks around the world make monetary policy decisions at discrete
points in time and with a stable frequency. For example, the Bank of Japan's monetary
11Note, that when ½ = 0 equation (12) reduces to (8), i.e. under the simple policy of section 2.1. gains
from commitment disappear when shocks are completely unpredictable.
12policy meetings take place twice a month, the Governing Council of the European Central
Bank meets monthly, while the Federal Open Markets Committee in the U.S. revises the
target federal funds rate eight times a year. In addition, monetary authorities in developed
countries typically announce the schedule of policy meetings well in advance.
When monetary policy is adjusted infrequently and on a pre-announced schedule, then
after each adjustment the central bank not only declares a new target, but also de facto
promises to leave it unchanged until the next policy meeting. This closely resembles short-
term sequential commitments of the previous section. The di®erence is that by ¯xing the
target for several periods, the central bank commits to a non-state-contingent rule (or, alter-
natively, it commits not to adjust). This implies a trade-o® between gains from commitment
and losses arising from central bank's inaction. Moreover, the trade-o® implicitly de¯nes the
optimal frequency of policy meetings - an important issue in monetary policy design.
In this section we consider a central bank that is unwilling or unable to commit to
an explicit policy rule but holds policy meetings at pre-announced dates. We will assume
that the economic agents believe that the monetary authority will adhere to the announced
schedule of the meetings. 12 First, we examine a simple case where the central bank adjusts
the interest rate every other period and establish the superiority of this policy relative to
period-by-period adjustment under pure discretion. Then we solve for the optimal frequency
of policy meetings and characterize its determinants. Finally, we examine the implications
of our analysis to the case of the Federal Open Markets Committee.
3.1 Central Bank's Problem Under Infrequent Adjustment
To keep things tractable, we begin with a central bank that commits to holding policy
meetings every other period. In every meeting period (denote t) it sets a new interest rate
and promises to keep it ¯xed for two periods. If the promise is credible, the private sector
12In other words, we abstract from the possibility of unscheduled meetings. This is a reasonable assumption
for major economies. For example, in the last decade only in 2001 has the FOMC had more than eight
meetings a year. As long as unscheduled meetings represent true emergencies and have a small unconditional
probability, their existence should not a®ect our main results.
13forecast of the next period's output is given by:
Etxt+1 = ¡'it + 'Et¼t+2 + Etxt+2 + ¹gt (16)
Similarly, expected next period in°ation can be written as:
Et¼t+1 = ¡¸'it + ¸¹gt + (¸' + ¯)Et¼t+2 + ¸Etxt+2 + ½ut (17)
Using (16) and (17) in (2) and (3) allows to express the IS and Phillips curve equations
as follows:
xt = ¡it (2' + '2¸) + '(¸' + ¯ + 1)Et¼t+2 + (¸' + 1)Etxt+2+
+ '½ut + ('¸¹ + ¹ + 1)gt
(18)
¼t = ¸xt ¡ ¯¸'it + (¸¯' + ¯2)Et¼t+2 + ¯¸Etxt+2 + (¯½ + 1)ut + ¯¸¹gt (19)
In contrast to the case of pure discretion, short-term commitments expand the policy
horizon to the duration of the interest rate ¯xity. At the time of interest rate adjustment

















where Ft represents expected losses beyond t+1, which are taken as given. The constraints
to the problem include the modi¯ed IS and Phillips curves at dates t (equations (18) and
(19)) and t + 1:
xt+1 = ¡'(it ¡ Et+1¼t+2) + Et+1xt+2 + gt+1 (21)
¼t+1 = ¸xt+1 + ¯Et+1¼t+2 + ut+1 (22)
where forecasts of ¼t+2 and xt+2 cannot be manipulated by the central bank and are taken as
14given. Inserting the constraints into the objective function and maximizing w.r.t. it yields























®(2 + '¸)xt + ¸(2 + '¸ + ¯)¼t = ¡¯ (®Etxt+1 + ¸Et¼t+1) (23)
Since the central bank is unable to respond to shocks in the next period, it sets the the
instrument at the level that minimizes average expected losses between policy meetings13.
This is similar to what one obtains in the Taylor model of price-setting where each ¯rm
adjusts its price periodically. However, this analogy is not as close as it seems. Firms'
infrequent revision of prices is typically justi¯ed by the existence of price adjustment costs.
In the absence of such costs ¯rms would always do better by revising prices every period. On
the other hand, central bank's actions have important external e®ects that de¯ne a di®erent
trade-o®. Although changing the interest rate on a period-by-period basis allows a timely
response to exogenous shocks, it features high output costs of reducing in°ation. On the
other hand, infrequent policy adjustment, while forcing the central bank to put up with
extra volatility arising from inaction, creates commitment gains from the ability to a®ect
short-term forecasts. As long as the gains from commitment exceed losses from inaction, the
central bank would choose infrequent policy meetings even when there are no explicit costs
of interest rate adjustment. Next, we de¯ne the equilibrium and evaluate welfare under the
two alternatives.
3.2 Equilibrium
13Note also that in the absence of next period considerations (¯ = 0) , the optimality condition reduces
to the standard solution without commitment.
15The presence of an endogenous state variable it¡1 in periods of central bank's inaction im-
plies that the minimum state vector is di®erent across periods. In particular, in periods
of adjustment the relevant state is summarized by contemporaneous shocks et = fgt;utg,
whereas in periods of inaction the relevant states can be summarized as st = fet¡1;etg. We
use the following notion of equilibrium:
De¯nition 1 A rational expectations infrequent policy adjustment equilibrium is described
by a set of policy functions fia(et);xa(et);¼a(et)g and fin(st);xn(st);¼n(st) g such that:
1. In periods of adjustment the policy is described by fia (¢);xa (¢);¼a (¢)g which satisfy
(18), (19) and (23).
2. In periods of central bank's inaction the policy is described by fin (¢);xn (¢);¼n (¢)g;
where: in (st) = ia
t¡1(et¡1) and xn (¢) and ¼n (¢) satisfy (2)-(3).
3. Private sector forecasts are consistent with the policy. That is:
² In periods of inaction, forecasts in (2) and (3) are given by
Etxt+1 = Etx
a(et+1) Et¼t+1 = Et¼
a(et+1)
² In periods of adjustment forecasts in (23) are given by (16) and (17), while the
forecasts in (16) and (17) are given by:
Etxt+2 = Etx
a(et+2) Et¼t+2 = Et¼
a(et+2)
Here we'll describe the solution in general terms14. First, start with periods of adjustment.
The equilibrium is described by a system of three expectational equations: (18), (19), and
(23). To obtain the solution, we can ¯rst substitute the interest rate out using one of the
14A complete solution is provided in Appendix C.
16equations. Second, since the system is linear and because all state variables in adjustment
periods are exogenous, we seek a solution of the form:
y
a
t = Det (24)
where yt = [xt;¼t]0; et = [gt;ut]0 and superscript a indicates periods of adjustment. Next,
note that since at t + 2 the central bank faces exactly the same problem as at time t,
rational expectations imply Etyt+2 = DP 2et, where P is a diagonal matrix with persistence
parameters (¹ and ½). Using this forecasting rule leaves us with a deterministic system of 4
linear equations in the unknown coe±cients of D; which is straightforward to solve15. Given




t = ªet (25)
In periods when the central bank rests, equilibrium is described (2) and (3) where in
t =
ia
t¡1 = ªet¡1 and Et¼t+1 and Etxt+1 must be consistent with the adjustment policy, i.e.
Etyt+1 = DPet. The solution of this system takes the form:
y
n
t = D1et¡1 + D2et (26)
where the superscript n indicates no-adjustment periods.
15Note that unlike in the case of pure discretion, the matrix D does not generally have zeros in the ¯rst
column. This is because with the interest rate being ¯xed for two periods, it is no longer optimal to neutralize
demand shocks at the time of adjustment. Instead, a policy of minimizing the average e®ects of demand and
supply shocks over two periods is preferred.
173.3 Welfare Measures
We use the unconditional expectation of the loss function (1) to measure social loss. In the






a) + 0:5E (L
n))
where E (La) and E (Ln) represent unconditional expectations of losses in times of adjust-
ment and inaction, respectively and are given by:






where ­ and § are, respectively, covariance and autocovariance matrices of et (­ = E(ete0
t)
and § = (et¡1e0
t)):
3.4 Discreteness vs. Discretion
As was mentioned above, the desirability of a policy of infrequent interventions depends
on the size of the gains from short-term commitment relative to losses arising from the
inability to respond to exogenous shocks in a timely fashion. In the benchmark model welfare
loss under the discrete adjustment policy (0:0045) is smaller than under period-by-period
adjustment with discretion (0:0053) 16. To provide a better intuition behind this result we
examine exact numerical solutions. In the benchmark model the equilibrium in periods of



























16As a reference point, the loss under life-time commitment is 0:0019:
18where the superscript da indicates periods of adjustment under discrete policy.





























The expressions reveal that even though the optimal policy under infrequent adjustment
allows in°ation and output to react to demand shocks, their contemporaneous e®ect is small,
and more so in the case of in°ation. Thus, both in°ation and output are mostly driven by
the supply shocks. The response of in°ation to supply shocks is smaller and the response of
output is larger under infrequent adjustment. This is a 'substitution e®ect' of lower output
costs of reducing in°ation: the central bank 'buys' more in°ation reduction at the expense
of output.
Next, consider central bank holidays. To characterize the equilibrium, note that the















In°ation and output are described by (21) and (22) where next period expectations must












































Although target variables in periods of inaction are functions of both current and past
shocks, in most cases past shocks enter with the opposing sign thus reducing the impact of
17The interest rate rule can be obtain from IS equation (18) where xt and ¼t are given by (28) and
Etxt+2 = ¹2D11gt + ½2D12ut and Et¼t+2 = ¹2D21gt + ½2D22ut.
19current shocks. The magnitude of this o®setting e®ect is large when shocks are persistent.
Intuitively, when persistence is high future shocks have a large predetermined component.
Since the central bank at the time of adjustment seeks to balance current and future expected
targets, the interest rate reacts to both contemporaneous shocks and to the predetermined
component of the next period's shocks. Thus, the larger the predetermined component,
the more e®ective is the policy makers' ability to neutralize shocks in two periods. An
interesting ¯nding implied by the solution is that despite infrequent adjustment, in°ation is
less responsive to supply shocks (and less volatile overall) in all periods, not only in periods
of intervention. This is due to the 'spillover' e®ect of short-term commitments: since agents
expect a more aggressive response to in°ationary pressures at the next policy meeting, the
e®ects of exogenous shocks on in°ation are not expected to persist for too long. Lower
in°ationary expectations, in turn, contain in°ation itself.
The solution further reveals that the impact of demand shocks on in°ation continues to
be small in periods of inaction: although the coe±cient on gt is larger than in (28), a negative
coe±cient on gt¡1 together with high persistence in gt imply a smaller overall e®ect. The
e®ect on output is also small, although larger than in the case of in°ation. On the other
hand, average impact of supply shocks on output for the most part is expected to be larger
than under pure discretion (because current and past shocks enter with the same sign).
Overall we conclude that the infrequent adjustment policy generates less volatile in°a-
tion and more volatile output in all periods, thus reducing the stabilization bias of the
discretionary policy. Table 1 summarizes standard deviations of in°ation and output across
periods and between policies in the baseline speci¯cation. Finally, Figure 2 illustrates gains
in in°ation-output variability tradeo® by plotting the e±cient policy frontier for the two al-
ternatives. The frontier is constructed by measuring unconditional variances of in°ation and
output for various values of ®18. The ¯gure shows that under the simple policy of infrequent
18The output weight (®) was changed by picking di®erent values of demand elasticity (q) in equation (27),
so as to keep ¸ unchanged. In the case of infrequent adjustment policy the depicted frontier corresponds to
average variances across periods of action and inaction
20Figure 2: E±cient Policy Frontier Under the Two Policies



























interventions the central bank faces a more favorable choice between in°ation and output
variability.
Table 1: Unconditional Volatility of Target Variables
Policy (Periods) St:Dev:(x) St:Dev:(¼)
Infrequent adjustment (work) 0:0383 0:00477
Infrequent adjustment (holiday) 0:0359 0:00483
Infrequent adjustment, average 0:0371 0:00480
Pure Discretion 0:0323 0:00537
To this end we have established that in the benchmark model the policy of infrequent
adjustments is preferable to pure discretion. Below we show that this conclusion holds for a
wide range of plausible parameter values.
3.4.1 Volatility of Exogenous Shocks
Figure 3 plots social losses for various standard deviations of demand and cost-push inno-
vations (¾^ g and ¾^ u). The left panel suggests that infrequent adjustment is more preferable
21Figure 3: Comparison of Policies: Role of Shock Volatility
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when cost-push innovations are more volatile. This is because more volatile supply shocks
call for greater attention to in°ation stabilization. The latter (in light of the previous dis-
cussion) is easier to achieve when the central has periodic holidays. The right panel tells
us that the volatility of demand shocks works against the case for more holidays. However,
since the impact of demand shocks on target variables is small, in the benchmark model ¾^ g
must be 50 times larger than ¾^ u for the central bank to choose pure discretion over periodic
holidays.
3.4.2 Persistence of Supply Shocks
As is evident from Figure 4, the desirability of infrequent interventions is increasing in the
persistence of the cost-push shocks19. Intuitively, the more persistent they are, the greater
is the pre-determined component of the conditional short-term forecasts of in°ation and
output, which, in turn, raises the importance of the central bank's ability to a®ect those
forecasts. A straightforward way to see this is to examine the simple commitment rules
of section 2. Note that k under commitment (see eq. (12)) reduces to unity when ½ = 0,
and is larger when it is large. Hence, gains from commitment are increasing in ½. In the
19Persistence of gt was not found to a®ect the ranking of the policies.
22Figure 4: Comparison of Policies: Role of Persistence in
Supply Shocks
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Infrequent Adjustment
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benchmark model with infrequent interventions, when ½ is roughly less than 0.17, bene¯ts
from commitment are not su±cient to outweigh the e®ects of demand shocks. However, this
threshold is far below what is empirically plausible.
3.4.3 Length of Price Stickiness
Duration of average price stickiness in the Calvo model is determined by the ¯rms' probability





. Thus, longer price stickiness decreases ¸ (see eq.
6), resulting in i) smaller sensitivity of in°ation to output °uctuations (hence a smaller e®ect
of demand shocks on in°ation); and ii) less weight of output in the social loss function (see
eq. 7). In light of the discussion above, both e®ects work to increase the desirability of the
discrete adjustment policy (see Figure 5).
3.4.4 Labor Supply Elasticity
Perhaps the most controversial parameter in macroeconomics is the elasticity of labor supply,
1
#. Most empirical estimates based on micro level data suggest values of elasticity in the
23Figure 5: Comparison of Policies: Role of Price Stickiness
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range of near zero to 0.5 (See, for example, Altonji (1986) or Domeij and Floden (2002)).
On the other hand, most of the macro studies suggest quite the opposite (e.g. Woodford
and Rotemberg (1992)). Prescott (2003) argues that a highly elastic labor supply is more
plausible to account for cross-country variations in labor e®ort 20. In the context of our
model, when labor is inelastic (high #), ¯rms' marginal cost schedules are very steep, raising
the impact of exogenous shocks on in°ation and making output stability a priority. The
opposite is true when the labor supply is highly elastic. In our baseline model infrequent
adjustment is preferred when the elasticity exceeds roughly 0:03 (see Figure 6), which is
plausible from both camps' perspectives.
4 Optimal Frequency of Policy Meetings
Next, we seek to characterize the optimal frequency of adjustment. This is done in two
steps. First we develop a solution to a more general model where the central bank revises
20In a more general setting other phenomena, such as sticky or e±ciency wages, can also a®ect output
sensitivity w.r.t. in°ation. A low # may be partly a metaphor for them.
24Figure 6: Comparison of Policies: Role of Labor Supply Elasticity







































the interest rate every T +1 periods. Then we choose the optimal T that minimizes expected
social loss. A complete solution to this model is presented in Appendix C .
4.1 Baseline Model
Figure 7 plots values of the social loss function for various T in the benchmark model. The
optimal frequency of policy meetings is once every six months (T = 5) or twice a year. With
the optimal frequency of adjustment the central bank can realize over 50 percent of the
gains obtainable under life-time commitment. To further illustrate the gains from moving to
the optimal frequency of adjustment, Figure 8 presents simulated series under the optimal
frequency of policy meetings. It shows that choosing the frequency optimally can achieve
sizable gains in stabilizing in°ation. Another observation is that the interest rate is more
stable. This is interesting in light of the recent research on interest rate smoothing. Interest
rate stability in this model stems in part from lengthier duration of interest rate ¯xity and in
part from the central bank's ability to a®ect longer-term forecasts. The latter is related to the
discussion in Woodford (1999): when monetary authority can a®ect longer term forecasts,
25Figure 7: Social Losses and Length of Commitment










































it takes a smaller change in the interest rate to achieve the desired e®ect on output and
in°ation. Note, however, that smoothing in this model is di®erent from what is implied by
Woodford's analysis. He examines the case of life-time commitment and therefore calls for
frequent, but very small adjustment of the interest rate. The main message in Figure 8 is
that when explicit long-term commitment is not feasible, smoothing occurs as a result of
infrequent but somewhat larger (although not too large) changes in the interest rate.
Finally, Figure 9 explores how the optimal time between policy meetings varies with
model parameters. Its interpretation is directly related to the discussion in section 3. Fac-
tors that decrease ¸ (see eq. 6) lower the importance of demand shocks and output sta-
bilization. Thus they raise the bene¯ts of infrequent adjustment and imply longer optimal
duration of inaction. More persistent supply shocks raise the importance of the predeter-
mined component of long-term forecasts and also increase the optimal duration between the
meetings. Interestingly, with higher persistence the optimal length of inaction appears to rise
exponentially. Finally, higher volatility of demand shocks relative to supply shocks raises
expected losses from inaction and works to increase the desirable frequency of monetary
26policy meetings.
Figure 8: Model Simulation Under Optimal Frequency of Adjustment


























27Figure 9: Optimal Frequency of Adjustment and Parameter Values
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Firms Demand Elasticity 
284.2 More Holidays for the FOMC?
To tailor our analysis to the case of the U.S. we consider an alternative calibration of some
model parameters, the most important of which are those describing stochastic processes of
exogenous shocks. We interpret cost-push shocks as exogenous markup variations arising
from labor market imperfections. As in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001) we de¯ne the wage
markup as the wedge between between the consumers' marginal disutility of labor and their









ULt is the inverse of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
















t ) = ¡
1
'
ln(Ct) ¡ #ln(Lt) + ln(wt) (33)
We construct the ln(¹w
t ) series from the previous equation using benchmark parameter values
and quarterly U.S. data covering 1947:1-2004:222 . The cost push shock ut is taken to be the





ut¡1 + ^ ut (34)
21See also Gali et. al. (2001)
22The data series are: Ct - real personal consumption expenditures (from BEA), Lt - hours in the nonfarm
business sector (from BLS), wt - real compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector (BLS). Con-
sumption and labor series were transformed into per capita levels using a measure of population obtained
from GDP and GDP per capita series (BEA).
29where the numbers in parenthesis are standard errors, and the standard deviation of the
innovation (¾^ u) is 0:0125. Ignoring the intercept term, and translating to monthly frequency,
the persistence parameter and the standard deviation of innovations are approximately 0:92
and 0:0072 respectively.
The demand shocks gt were constructed using the deviations of the share of government





gt¡1 + ^ gt (35)
with ¾^ g = 0:0243. Similarly, approximate values of shock persistence and standard devia-
Figure 10: Social Loss and Length of Commitment: Alter-
native Calibration









































tion of innovations are 0 :9 and 0:0140 at the monthly frequency. Finally, we consider the
possibility of lower duration of average price stickiness. At the lower end we take the average
estimate in Gali et. al. (2001) of 2.35 quarters, or 7 months, and at the high end we take the
commonly used value of 12 months. First, consider the lower-end value. Figure 10 plots loss





from the HP trend. Here G¡ government
current expenditures, and Y - nominal GDP (both series taken from the BEA):
30functions under the four policies. It reveals that under alternative calibration the optimal
choice of the frequency of policy meetings (once every six months) the central bank can gain
about 75 percent of the total gains available under life-time commitment.
As an alternative, we also quantify these gains using the "in°ation equivalent" measure:
a permanent deviation of in°ation from its target that generates the same welfare loss as
a move from commitment to discretion. Dennis and SÄ oderstrÄ om (2002) use this measure
to quantify gains from commitment in New Keynesian models. As they point out, the cor-
respondence between "in°ation equivalent" and the percentage reduction in the value of




(1 ¡ ¯)(Ldiscretion ¡ Lalternative)
Under our calibration welfare gains from life-time commitment are equivalent to a per-
manent reduction in the deviation of in°ation from its target by 2.96% 24.On the other hand,
a move from pure discretion to the optimal frequency of policy meetings is equivalent to a
permanent reduction by 2.52%, generating 85% of the total possible gains measured using
the "in°ation equivalent".
Finally, the optimal duration between FOMC meetings under the alternative calibration
and for various durations of price stickiness is presented in Figure 10. The result suggests
that the FOMC should allow at least ¯ve months of no adjustment or, put di®erently, it
should meet no more than twice a year.
4.3 Directions for Future Research
Considerations of clarity and simplicity led us to conduct the analysis above within a very
simple and a purely forward looking model. This leaves a number of interesting extensions for
future research. First, in light of Fuhrer (1997), Mankiw and Reis (2002) and many others it
24This is consistent with Dennis and SÄ oderstrÄ om (2002). In their models/calibrations life-time commitment
reduces in°ation by 0.05% to 3.6%
31Figure 11: Optimal Duration Between FOMC Meetings:
Alternative Calibration
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would be interesting to examine the optimal frequency of policy decisions in an environment
where some agents are either backward-looking or do not update their information set.
Second, an analysis of the e®ects of model uncertainty on the optimal frequency of policy
meetings would certainly increase our understanding of the proper policy design. Thirdly,
central banks around the world use targets at di®erent horizons. The exact horizon of the
target is likely to a®ect the optimal frequency of policy meetings. Fourth, our analysis could
be extended by explicitly introducing emergency/unscheduled meetings. Their presence is
likely to lower in°ationary expectations, requiring fewer scheduled meetings. Fifth, many
central banks, and the Federal Reserve in particular, often use additional tools in a®ecting
private sector expectations, such as FOMC bias announcements25. Private sector and the
media perceive bias announcements as indications of future policy changes. The latter clearly
gives the Fed an extra leverage in in°uencing private sector forecasts.
The analysis of the optimal frequency of policy decisions from the standpoint of commit-
25Conley, Dupor and Mirzoev (2004) discuss the usefulness of bias announcements in the estimation of
monetary policy rules.
32ment could also be applied in other areas of macroeconomics, most importantly the ¯scal
policy. Klein and Rios-Rull (2003) show that partial commitment has important implications
for the optimal ¯scal policy. Our analysis could be applied to their problem to study the op-
timal length of commitment. More generally, examining the optimal frequency of adjusting
various income, trade and other taxes could be of great interest to macroeconomists.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the issue of optimal frequency of monetary policy meetings.
Viewing infrequent adjustment of monetary policy as simple short-term sequential com-
mitments, we showed that it is preferred to period by period adjustment under discretion.
Crucial in our argument is the ¯nding that bene¯ts from commitment spread to periods of
central bank's inaction. This happens because expectations of aggressive in°ation stabiliza-
tion at the time of policy adjustment contain in°ation and mute e®ects of exogenous shocks
in times when the central bank is on holiday. In addition we have provided a solution for
the optimal frequency of policy meetings. Under a sensible calibration describing the U.S.
economy the model prescribes holding FOMC meetings twice a year or less.
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36A Equilibrium in a Simple Model of One-Period Se-
quential Commitments
Here we describe a solution to a model where the central bank announces commitment to a new policy every
other period. Assuming that the interest rate policy also neutralizes demand shocks (it = °ut+ 1
'gt:) implies
that the IS equation at the time of announcement is:
xt = ¡'(°ut ¡ Et¼t+1) + Etxt+1 (36)
Since the rule is valid in the next period, rational expectation of the next period's output is:
Etxt+1 = ¡'°½ut + 'Et¼t+2 + Etxt+2 ´ ¡'°½ut + f2t
where the two period ahead forecasts (summarized in f2t) are taken by the CB as given. Similarly, next
period's in°ation forecast is:
Et¼t+1 = ¸Etxt+1 + ¯Et¼t+2 + ½ut ´ ¡¸'°½ut + f3t
where f3t = ¯Et¼t+2 + ¸f2t + ½ut. The last two expressions can be combined with the IS curve to obtain
output as a function of exogenous shocks and long-term forecasts. Using the expression for output to modify





1 + '¸½ + ½
¶
xt + f4t + ut (37)
where f4t summarizes two period ahead forecasts. The extra output term appearing in (37) represents the
e®ect of short-term commitment on next period's in°ation forecast (compare to equation 11). The output






relative to pure discretion.
At the time of announcement, the central bank's problem is to minimize (9) with T = 1 subject to (37).







Note that k1 < k2 < 1; i.e. under short-term commitment output cost of reducing in°ation is higher than
under long-term commitments but lower than under pure discretion, as hypothesized earlier.
The minimum aggregate state vector in this model is the vector of exogenous shocks et = fgt;utg. The
restriction that the interest rate policy must neutralize the demand shocks implies that in°ation and output
must be functions of supply shocks only. With these in mind, we use the following de¯nition of a rational
expectations equilibrium.
De¯nition 2 A rational expectations equilibrium is described by policy functions it(et);xt(ut); and ¼t(ut)
such that:
1. Equations (2) and (3) are satis¯ed in all periods.
2. In periods of policy announcement, policies x and ¼ must also satisfy (38).
373. In periods when no announcement is made, in°ation and output are given by26:
xt(ut) = xt¡1(ut); ¼t(ut) = ¼t¡1(ut) it(et) = it¡1(et):
4. Private sector forecasts in (2) and (3) are consistent with the central bank's policy:
Etxt+1 = Etxt+1(ut+1); Et¼t+1 = Et¼t+1(ut+1):
Given the linear-quadratic structure of the problem, the last condition requires that in announcement
periods expected in°ation and output are given by:
Et¼t+1 = ½¼t and Etxt+1 = ½xt: (39)
Moreover, since the central bank solves the same problem every announcement period it will always announce
the same rule. Hence in equilibrium (38) and (39) must hold in all periods and policy rules it(¢);xt(¢); and
¼t(¢) are time-invariant. The solution is obtained by combining (38), (39) and (3):
x1c






26This is equivalent to saying that the pre-announced policy is valid in non-announcement periods.
38B Unconstrained Optimum Under Limited Commit-
ment
Here we describe the unconstrained optimum under long- and short-term commitment. The case of life-time
commitment has been examined in CGG99. Recall that in that case the central bank chooses in°ation and











°t+i (¼t+i ¡ ¸xt+i ¡ ¯Et¼t+1+i ¡ ut+i)
¸) (41)
The optimal policy (see CGG99) is described by:
xt+i ¡ xt+i¡1 = ¡ ¸
®¼t+i, i = 1;2;3:::::
and xt+i = ¡ ¸
®¼t+i, i = 0
(42)
Next we turn to the case of partial commitment.
B.1 Partial (Short-Term) Commitment
Suppose that at time t the central bank announces a rule that is valid until t + T. Before analyzing this




¯i (¸xt+i + ut+i)
Since the commitment is set to expire at a ¯nite future date, the central can only manipulate private sector
forecasts until the expiration date of the announced policy rule. Hence, the sequence of constraints from the









¯i¡j (¸xt+i + ut+i) + ¯T+1¡jEt+j¼t+T+1
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
¼t+T = ¸xt+T + ut+T + ¯Et+T¼t+T+1
39where all forecasts of ¼t+T+1 are taken by the central bank as given. The policy for in°ation and output is





































where F1t summarizes expected losses beyond t + T and F2t = Et¼t+T+1: The ¯rst order conditions are
given by:
for i = 0 :
®xt+i + ¸°t+i = 0
¼t+i ¡ °t+i = 0
(44)
for T ¸ i > 0:
®xt+i + ¸(°t + °t+1 + ::: + °t+i) = 0
¼t+i ¡ °t+i = 0
(45)




¼t+i, i = 0 (46)
xt+i ¡ xt+i¡1 = ¡
¸
®
¼t+i, i = 1;2;3:::::T (47)
The only di®erence is that the commitment expires at time t + T, at which point the central bank re-
optimizes and announces a new commitment. Since the structure of the problem faced by the "new" central
bank at time t+T +1 is the same as at time t, it will announce the same policy. We use the following notion
of equilibrium.




















j=0; where j indicates position of period t within the commitment cycle (0¡time
of announcement, T ¡ commitment expiration date) and s
j
t summarizes the vector of states at time t relevant
at j'th stage of the commitment cycle27, such that:
1. Equations (2) and (3) always hold.
2. In periods of announcement the policy also satis¯es (46).
3. In intermediate periods the policy also satis¯es (47).
27As will become clear below for j = 0, s
j





404. Private sector forecasts are consistent with the policy. That is:
² In periods of announcement, forecasts in (2) and (3) are given by
Etxt+1 = Etx1(s1
t+1) Et¼t+1 = Et¼1(s1
t+1)
² In intermediate periods for j = 1;:::;T ¡ 1, the forecasts in (2) and (3) are given by:
Et+jxt+j+1 = Et+jxj+1(s
j+1
t+j+1) Et+j¼t+j+1 = Et+j¼j+1(s
j+1
t+j+1)
² In the period of policy expiration, the forecasts in (2) and (3) are given by:
Etxt+1 = Etx0(s0
t+1) Et¼t+1 = Et¼0(s0
t+1)
The cyclical nature of commitments implies di®erent processes describing output and in°ation in three
types of periods: periods of policy announcement, periods of policy expiration and intermediate periods. In
times of policy announcement, the following 3 equations describe the evolution of in°ation, contemporaneous
policy and the expected policy respectively:
¼t = ¸xt + ¯Et¼t+1 + ut; xt = ¡
¸
®







Combining the three, we obtain the following di®erence equation in output:
xt = ¯
®
®(1 + ¯) + ¸2Etxt+1 ¡
¸
®(1 + ¯) + ¸2ut (48)
Similarly, in intermediate periods, the following 3 equations are valid:
¼t = ¸xt + ¯Et¼t+1 + ut; xt = xt¡1 ¡
¸
®










®(1 + ¯) + ¸2xt¡1 + ¯
®
®(1 + ¯) + ¸2Etxt+1 ¡
¸
®(1 + ¯) + ¸2ut (49)
Finally, in the last period, when the commitment expires, we have:
¼t = ¸xt + ¯Et¼t+1 + ut; xt = xt¡1 ¡
¸
®







® + ¸2xt¡1 + ¯
®
® + ¸2Etxt+1 ¡
¸
® + ¸2ut (50)
To summarize, if we start with period t when a new commitment is announced, then output between
41periods t and t + T evolves according to:
xt = ¯±1Etxt+1 ¡ ¸
®±1ut
xt+1 = ±1xt + ¯±1Et+1xt+2 ¡ ¸
®±1ut+1
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::
xt+T¡1 = ±1xt+T¡2 + ¯±1Et+T¡1xt+T ¡ ¸
®±1ut+T¡1
xt+T = ±2xt+T¡1 + ¯±2Et+Txt+T+1 ¡ ¸
®±2ut+T
(51)
where ±1 = ®
®(1+¯)+¸2 and ±2 = ®
®+¸2. The system of equations above fully characterizes the evolution
of output within each commitment 'cycle'.
The solution presented below proceeds as follows. First, note that under the optimal policy output does
not respond to demand shocks (i.e. the interest rate policy neutralizes demand shocks as it does under pure
discretion). Given the linear-quadratic nature of the problem, we can guess that at time t (beginning of
the commitment cycle) the policy takes the following form: xt = !1ut. Model stationarity implies that the
policy at the beginning of the next cycle will have the same form: xt+T+1 = !1ut+T+1. Hence, at time t
rational agents expect Etxt+T+1 = !1Etut+T+1 = !1½T+1ut. To solve the model, we can start with t + T
and through backward substitution of the equations in (51) express each xt+j, j = 0;1:::T as a function of
Et+jxt+T+1, past outputs and shocks. Note that the resulting equation for xt will not depend on past output
and therefore can be solved for !1; which gives us the equilibrium output policy in periods of announcement.
Output response in all other periods can be obtained recursively. Finally, in°ation is obtained from the
central bank's F.O.C.'s.
B.2 Equilibrium in Announcement Periods
Starting with period t + T in (51), we can recursively substitute out all forecasts between t and t + T:
at t + T :




which implies that Et+T¡1xt+T = ±2xt+T¡1 + ¯±2Et+T¡1xt+T+1 ¡ ¸
®±2½ut+T¡1. Using this in the





±1xt+T¡2 + (¯±1)(¯±2)Et+T¡1xt+T+1 ¡
¸
®
±1 (1 + ¯½±1)±2ut+T¡1
¶
Continuing in this fashion, it is easy to see, that output throughout the commitment cycle can be
represented as follows:
For j 2 [1;T]:
xt+j = Aj
·




















Bj = 1 + ¯½±1Aj+1Bj+1
(54)




;CT = ¯±1;BT = 1
Having solved for the coe±cients, we can obtain the equilibrium in periods of announcement. Using











This gives a solution for output in periods of announcement. In°ation is obtained from the central
bank's ¯rst order condition. Since both in°ation and output both depend on contemporaneous shocks only,
their unconditional variances and expected social losses in periods of announcement are straightforward to
compute.
B.3 Equilibrium in Non-Announcement Periods
To obtain equilibrium in other periods we exploit the functional form of the solution in periods of announce-
ment. Note that for any j; Et+jxt+T+1 = ½T+1¡j!1ut+j: Use this to iterate (52) forward and express output
in each period as a function of exogenous shocks only.
At time t + 1 :
































































0 ut + a
(j)








where the upperscript (j) indicates the coe±cients' dependence on j. Using the central bank's ¯rst order
43condition, we can express in°ation as:
¼t+j = ¡®























Using these representations of in°ation and output, computing unconditional variances of in°ation and













































where °0 = E(u2) and °i's are i¡th order autocovariances of ut.




[®V ar(xt+j) + V ar(¼t+j)] (61)












44C Solution to a Model of Infrequent Policy Adjust-
ment
Here we assume that the Central Bank ¯xes the interest rate at t until some future date t + T. The logic of
the solution is the same as before. First we would like to eliminate all endogenous forecasts until date t+T.
Then, we solve for the optimal policy at date t and back up the equilibrium in periods of inaction. Note,












subject to a sequence of T + 1 Phillips curve and IS constraints. To obtain the ¯rst order condition, we
¯rst obtain the impact of the current interest rate on each future forecasts of in°ation and output. Since
the forecasts beyond date t + T when the commitment expires are taken by the CB as given, we start from










At date T ¡ 1 the impact is:
@Etxt+T¡1

























j , T ¸ j ¸ 0
we can see that the impact can be expressed in a recursive form:
Bx















for any j 2 [0;T) and for j = T, the impact is
Bx
t+T = ¡'; and B¼
t+T = ¡¸' (64)










45C.1 Modi¯ed Structural Equations
To solve for the equilibrium we perform repeated substitutions to express each Etxt+j and Et¼t+j, j 2 [0;T]
above as a function of the current period interest rate and the variables which the Central Bank takes as
given: exogenous states ut and gt and time t + T + 1 forecasts of in°ation and output. Each forecast in the
equation above can be represented as:
Etxt+j = Bx
j it + Axx
j Etxt+T+1 + Ax¼
j Et¼t+T+1 + A
xg
j gt + Axu
j ut (66)
Et¼t+j = B¼
j it + A¼x
j Etxt+T+1 + A¼¼
j Et¼t+T+1 + A
¼g
j gt + A¼u
j ut (67)
where coe±cients B and A are constants. In the same way as we derived the coe±cients on it is possible




































































for any j 2 [0;T) and for j = T the initial values are:
Ax¼
t+T = '; and A¼¼
t+T = ¯ + ¸'
Axx








t+T = 0; and A¼u
t+T = ½T
(72)
46C.2 Equilibrium in Period of Adjustment




























































































































































it = C1 ¢
¡
































To solve for equilibrium in periods when the interest rate is adjusted, we combine the previous equation




































DP T+1 = Bx
0C1A4 + A20 | {z }
´C3
This is a system of 4 linear equations in coe±cients of D which are straightforward to solve.
C.3 Equilibrium in Periods of Non-Adjustment
In periods when the interest rate is ¯xed (0 < j · T), equilibrium is described by:
xt+j = ¡'it + Et+jxt+j+1 + 'Et+j¼t+j+1 + gt+j (79)
¼t+j = ¸xt+j + ¯Et+j¼t+j+1 + ut+j (80)
with T ¸ j > 0. These equations can be also expressed as:
xt+j = Bx
j it + Axx
j Et+jxt+T+1 + Ax¼









j it + A¼x
j Et+jxt+T+1 + A¼¼

















































28A0 = A10DP T+1 + A20







= C5jet + C6jet+j









0 + 2(c5j2ª)§j (c6j2)
0 (84)
where c5j1 and c5j2 are ¯rst and second elements of C5j, c6j1 and c6j2 are rows of C6j, ­ is unconditional
covariance matrix of et and §j is the unconditional correlation matrix E(etet+j).
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